The Allocation of Attorney\u27s Fees after Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. by Editors, Law Review
The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.
The legal system of the United States has traditionally refused to
award attorney's fees to the successful litigant.1 Defenders of the rule
emphasize that it encourages the resolution of controversies through
the courts, enhances predictability, and promotes the security and con-
fidence of the prospective litigant.2 Recently, however, the rule has been
the focus of substantial criticism.3 Commentators point out that while
the citizen need not pay his opponent's fees, neither can he recover the
cost of his own lawyer. As a result, soaring legal fees have vitiated the
impact of lowered financial risk and have effectively excluded the poor4
(and increasingly the middle class)5 from active participation in the
legal process.
1 The United States may be unique among the nations of the world in its failure to
grant legal fees to the successful party. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and
the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. Rrv. 792, 793 (1966).
2 For classic discussions of the pros and cons of the American fee rule compare Mc-
Cormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931), with Goodhart, Costs, 38 YAxE LJ. 849 (1929), and Note,
Distribution of Legal Expenses Among Litigants, 49 YALE LJ. 699 (1940).
3 Four major articles in the 1960's, all critical of the fee system and all cited by the
Mills court, are Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L.
Rav. 75, 78 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development,
38 COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?,
20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967); and Ehrenzweig, supra note 1.
4 Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. R v. 381
(1964). One of the distinctive anomalies at the core of the American fee system is that
while it is responsible for the exclusion of the poor from the legal process, it is defended
as a protection for the indigent who might otherwise be "unjustly discouraged from in-
stituting actions to vindicate their rights." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); accord, Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227,
237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). The traditional argument answers the question:
What would be the effect on the poor of increased litigating risks? Whatever the merits
of the answer, the question is wrong because it implies the reality of a free access system
which does not exist in fact. Better questions might be: Would more meritorious claims
by poor citizens be excluded by the risks of fee shifting than are now excluded by their
inability to retain legal counsel? Should the operative criteria for exclusion be economic
power or the individual's own judgment as to the merits of his case?
5 Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The
Problem, the Duty, and a Solution, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 811, 814 (1965). The resulting
situation in which practical legal rights have become the exclusive companion of the
well-to-do is the peculiar gift of the traditional fee rule to our society. Economic power
becomes determinative of legal rights irrespective of its position in the case. Wealthy
plaintiffs can realize awards on groundless claims "because the defendant will prefer to
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The system's two-pronged response to this dilemma-the contingent
fee device and the legal aid office-has proven inadequate. The former
has only a limited applicability, confined principally to the personal
injury area.6 Legal aid, on the other hand, fails because there are too
few offices, and too few talented and experienced lawyers willing to
devote themselves to low income work.7 Moreover, as Ehrenzweig bit-
terly notes: "[A]ll the law now offers the little man, outside that
second-rate court at some places and at some times, is charity. Legal
aid, rather than legal right."s
In the recent case of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,9 the Supreme
Court may have taken steps to alter the traditional rule. Mills involved
a stockholders' suit that failed to fit any of the traditional exceptions
to the fee doctrine. Not only did the Court grant attorneys' fees to the
plaintiff, but the broad language of the opinion suggests that basic
changes in the fee-denying rule may soon follow. This comment will
examine (1) the setting of the Mills decision, (2) the language of the
case itself, and (3) the impact of the language on the traditional fee
system.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN FEE SYSTEM PRIOR TO Mills
The federal courts have never completely followed the traditional
anti-fee-shifting doctrine.10 Exceptions fall roughly into three categories.
pay the plaintiff an amount less than the expense of fighting the case. This is the nuisance
value of the suit ... a legalized form of blackmail." Kuenzel, supra note 3, at 78.
On the other hand, the moneyed defendant "irrespective of the justice of his position,
can wrest victory from his 'little' opponent by designedly protracting litigation, imposing
an unbearable burden of attorney fees that can never be recouped." Stoebuck, supra note 3,
at 202.
6 Where the anticipated award is not large, the contingent fee device is inoperative-
creating a gap in practical legal rights which cuts hardest in the area of civil liberties.
Kuenzel, supra note 3, at 78-86. Yet the contingent fee device is controversial even in
those areas within which it is operative. For perspective on the "ambulance chasing" issue
compare F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964), with the less
enthusiastic Note, Lawyer's Tightrope-Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 CORNELL L. REv.
683, 699-700 (1956). Whatever the ethical effects on lawyers, the psychological impact on
the poor may be far more important. In 1924 R. H. Smith wrote, "The man whose leg
or arm has been cut off would prefer to accept half of the amount awarded him by a jury
than to receive nothing through his inability to gain his day in court." R.H. SMrrH,
JusTiCE AND THE Po R 85 (1924). In 1970 when mass violence finds its origin in perceptions
of helplessness and being cheated, half as much justice may no longer be acceptable. See
REPORT OF THE PREsiDENT's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTICE, Tim CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociEry 37-38 (1967). See also Note, supra
note 3, at 1226, suggesting that a bar anxious to maintain the contingent fee device main-
tains a powerful vested interest in retaining the traditional fee rule.
7 Carlin & Howard, supra note 4, at 410, 416-17.
8 Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 796.
9 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
10 An examination of fee shifting under state law is beyond the scope of this paper.
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First, a limited number of federal statutes provide for mandatory fee
shifting where the successful plaintiff has been injured by a violation
of those statutes,1 or where the defendant is forced to comply with the
order of an administrative agency.12 This exception represents a posi-
tive legislative determination as to the benefits of augmenting statutory
regulations with private fee incentives.
The government has set up a regulatory system for the benefit
of persons in the plaintiff's class. . . Suits by plaintiffs, if
well founded, are in the public interest. Therefore, the cost
of prosecuting successful suits should be borne not by those
who were victims but by those who have violated the regula-
tions and caused the damage.' 3
A different philosophy is reflected in the second exception to the
anti-fee doctrine. This exception consists of federal statutes which per-
mit fee shifting to either plaintiff or defendant at the discretion of the
court. Discretionary fee shifting under these statutes has generally been
limited to situations where bad faith triggers fee transfer under a pun-
ishment rationale.14 Thus, fee granting under discretionary statutes re-
Stoebuck's article details a long list of statutes authorizing fee transfer under state law in
everything from actions for divorce to actions for unpaid wages. "Taken together, the
cases in which substantial attorney fees may be recovered comprise a sizable portion of
American litigation ...." Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 210. Instances of fee shifting on the
federal and state levels contrast sharply with traditional doctrine which labels fee transfer
as impractical. "[T]his grafted litigation might possibly be more animated and protracted
than in the original cause." Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359 F.2d
156, 159 (9th Cir. 1966).
11 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206
(1964). As a corollary to the injury requirement, at least under the Clayton Act, the courts
have held that no recovery of fees is possible where only injunctive relief is requested.
Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp.
888, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
12 Packers & Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1964); Perishable Agricultural Coin-
modities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1964); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1964);
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964).
13 Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943).
14 For example, the Securities Act of 1933 levies fees where the suit or defense is
"without merit," 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964); the Servicemen's Readjustment Act for viola-
tions committed "knowingly," 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1964); and fees may not be shifted
under the Trust Indenture Act if the litigant can prove that he acted in "good faith,"
15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1964). Where specific statutory language is absent, the courts
generally imply a good faith requirement, denying fee transfer under copyright law where
the infringement results from honest mistake, Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329
(E.D.N.Y. 1954); and under patent laws where there is a failure to find "unfairness or
bad faith in the conduct of the losing party," Keuffel & Esser Co. v. Masback, Inc.,
131 F. Supp. 237, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). While the punishment rationale has limited awards
to plaintiffs, even more restrictive criteria are applied to fee awards to defendants. Note,
Attorney's Fees as an Element of Costs: The Copyright Experience, 4 GEORGIA L. Rav. 571,
581 (1970)-
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quires the party seeking to recover attorney's fees to win not only the
merits of his case, but the sympathy of the court as well.15 Fee transfer
under this punishment rationale implies significant limitations on the
level of fee shifting. It focuses on the motives of the parties and ignores
the broader issue of the restraints placed on private law enforcement by
the high costs of litigation. Finally, when the awards are made, the
amounts granted are generally regarded as insufficient; they are more
closely related to the damage award than to the actual time spent in
preparation for the case.16
The third exception consists of a number of extra-statutory, dis-
cretionary categories developed by the federal courts under color of
their historic equity jurisdiction. Reflecting the discretionary practice
under the statutes, the courts have chosen to shift fees in a limited
number of areas, generally under a punishment rationale. 17 However,
there does exist a class of cases not based upon a punishment rationale.
This "fund" category relates to that situation where plaintiff's repre-
sentative action results in the creation of a fund, the economic benefit
of which is shared by all the members of the represented class. The
Supreme Court long ago held that failure to shift fees in this situation
"would not only be unjust to [the plaintiff] but it would give to the
other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an un-
fair advantage.""' Here the fee transfer is triggered not by the wrong-
doing of the defendant, but by the positive benefit attendant to the
plaintiff's action.
The equitable impulse to grant fees has made itself felt even in the
face of statutory schemes where the court's discretion seems highly
limited. In a cause of action arising under a statute which is itself
silent on fees, complex questions are evoked as to whether the legis-
lative remedies are supplementary or limiting. The force of the fee
shifting impulse in a statutory context is demonstrated by three de-
cades of developments in the trademark area.
As late as 1937, the Second Circuit recognized a theoretical power
to grant fees in trademark infringement suits but concluded that "the
15 Note, supra note 14, at 576.
i6 Id. at 588.
17 Fees are shifted in admiralty cases where "the default was willful and persistent,"
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 US. 527, 531 (1962); in contempt cases where "willfulness in-
herent in the contemptuous act is a major consideration," In re Federal Fadlities Realty
Trust, 227 F.2d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 1955); and generally, as in Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1950), where litigants "have been subjected to dis-
criminatory and oppressive conduct." In the trademark exception "the absence of fraud
... precludes allowance of counsel fees to plaintiff." Fancee Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free
Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
is Trustees v. Greenough, 105 US. 527, 532 (1882).
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allowance of costs has with practical uniformity been restricted to
those authorized by the fee bill or some other statutory provision."'19
However, only three years later, the Seventh Circuit in Alladin Mfg.
Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 20 relying simply on its equitable powers and
neither citing precedent nor providing discussion in support of the
result, granted fees against a "wilful and fraudulent" infringer.
By the late 1950's the preference of the federal courts on the subject
of fees was quite apparent. Alladin had become the departure point
for a long line of decisions transferring fees in trademark infringement
suits brought under the Lanham Act, which was itself silent on the
fee question.21 Even in the face of intricate questions of statutory intent,
the courts maintained that fees could be granted.
Mere silence and inaction by Congress cannot be held to have
repealed what has been found to be a well established judicial
power. Even though the Lanham Act may have been intended
to be an integrated and comprehensive set of rules for trade-
mark regulation and litigation to the exclusion of all conflict-
ing rules, the retention of discretionary judicial power over
the fixing of costs does not seem such a threat of inconsistency
that it should by implication be held pre-empted or repealed
by the Act.22
The legal system was involved in what seemed to be a timely and
appropriate reaction to a new sense of awareness about the relationship
between legal fees and the practical availability of justice. Just as
criticism of the American rule on fees had reached an all time high,2s
the courts were making use of their equitable power to grant fees with
a regularity previously unmatched. Nevertheless, it was at this very
point that the Supreme Court chose to take a stunning step backward,
and in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.24 not only
19 Gold Dust Corp. v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1937). The court denied
fees to the successful defendant after plaintiff failed to prove that "Silver Dust" was an
infringement of plaintiff's trademark "Gold Dust."
20 Alladin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 1941). The success-
ful plaintiff, a lamp manufacturer, had incurred legal expenses of over $18,000 in proving
that his trademark "Alladin" had been infringed. The court awarded counsel fees noting
that "this sum was recoverable as compensatory damages."
21 See, e.g., Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); National Van
Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1956); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity
Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956); Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517
(2d Cir. 1953).
22 A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distilleries, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 374, 377
(D. Del. 1962).
23 Authorities cited note 3 supra.
24 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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destroyed the trademark exception, but created a reaction reaching the
whole system, chilling the granting of attorney's fees in areas far afield
of trademark litigation.
In Fleischmann, the Ninth Circuit had held that the congressional
silence in the Lanham Act, and the lack of any positive rationale in
the many fee-granting precedents, required the denial of fee transfer.25
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court affirmed with a hard line defense of
the traditional fee doctrine. The Court noted the uncertainties of liti-
gation,26 the necessity that "one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, '27 and the "time, expense, and
difficulties of proof inherent in the question of litigating what consti-
tutes reasonable attorney's fees." 28
Fleischmann recognized only three limited, non-statutory exceptions
to the general fee rule,29 and concluded that "[w]hen a cause of action
has been created by a statute which expressly provides the remedies
for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily be im-
plied."30 The chilling effect on the lower courts soon became apparent
as attorney's fees were denied on the basis of Fleischmann in actions
brought under the Interstate Commerce Act3l and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,32 both of which were silent on the question of at-
torney's fees in the relevant sections. It seemed that Fleischmann had
25 Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359 F.2d 156, 159-61 (9th Cir.
1966).
28 386 US. at 718.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 The exceptions recognized involved the admiralty, the fund and the contempt cases.
386 U.S. at 718-19. See note 17 supra.
30 386 U.S. at 720.
31 Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Mackinac Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 202 (W.D. Mich.
1967), denied fees in an action brought under 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1964). That section is
silent on attorney's fees. §§ 8, 15(9), and 16(2) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce
Act specifically provide for the recovery of attorney's fees. 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 15(9), 16(2)
(1964). An identical result was achieved by the Eighth Circuit in Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1969). Here plaintiffs obtained a declaratory judgment
as to their voting rights on a plan of consolidation which resulted in separate voting
by Class A and Class B stockholders and the defeat of the proposed consolidation. In
the action brought under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5, 5(11) (1964),
the court held that "in our view the recent case of Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co. .. . controls the issue here. . . .As we read Fleischmann, exceptions to
the general rule are sparingly granted. The factual situation here does not fall within
any exceptions recognized by Fleischmann." 407 F.2d at 1082-83.
32 Chancy v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1968), where
fees were denied in an action brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. 78j (1964). Fees were also denied in Stevens v. Abbott, Procter & Paine, 288 F.
Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968), where the court found a violation of § 10 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 prohibiting manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with sales
of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
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ushered in an era of conservatism even at a time when the fee system
was undergoing its greatest criticism. 33 The voices urging change had
not only failed to alter official policy, but had seen thirty years of growth
in court-created exceptions suddenly wiped out.
Nevertheless, in 1968 a civil rights case gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to register an apparent modification of its previously
hostile attitude toward fee shifting. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc24 arose under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196435 which
includes the following provision:
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person.3 6
Characteristically, the section had evolved into a means of punishment
levied against recalcitrant defendants who had to be prodded by re-
peated suits before accepting the legislative mandate on integration.3 7
It was this punishment aspect which had caused the circuit court to
refuse to award fees below: "No litigant ought to be punished under
the guise of an award of counsel fees (or in any other manner) from
taking a position in court in which he honestly believes-however lack-
ing in merit that position may be." 38
In its decision, the full importance of which is realized only in
juxtaposition with Mills, the Supreme Court held that "one who suc-
ceeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title should ordinarily
recover an attorney's fee unless circumstances should render such an
award unjust."39
In what appeared to be a marked change from its Fleischmann posi-
tion, the Supreme Court went out of its way to increase the incidence
of fee granting, at least in the civil rights area.40 More importantly, the
court de-emphasized the problem-laden punishment theory and pro-
vided instead the groundwork for a positive theory of fee shifting for
the American system. The Court stated:
33 See authorities cited note 3 supra.
84 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
35 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(2) (1964), prohibiting discrimination in restaurants affecting
interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute.
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-B(b) (1964).
37 See Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1875, 1878 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
3 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
39 390 U.S. at 402.
40 See Note, Civil Rights-Attorney's Fees, 4 HARv. CIV. RlGHTs-Civ. Lw. L. REv. 223
(1969), concluding at 225: "No logical imperative leads to the conclusion that Congress
intended a mandatory fee. If Congress had so intended, it could have explicitly done so."
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A Title II suit is... private in form only. When a plaintiff
brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages.
If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone
but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority.41
Following Piggie Park, the lower federal courts have shown a marked
propensity to award fees in civil rights cases. For example, in litigation
involving school desegregation, 42 legislative reapportionment,43  and
police misconduct,44 lower federal courts awarded fees without express
congressional authorization. In Mills the Supreme Court was squarely
confronted with the issue of whether this emerging liberalism of the
federal courts should be curtailed or encouraged.
II. MILLS v. ELEc'rRIc AUTo-LIE Co.
In Mills stockholders in Electric Auto-Lite Company sought to dis-
solve a 1936 merger of their company with Merganthaler Linotype.
The legal rationale was an alleged violation of rule 14(a) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, forbidding solicitation of shareholders'
41 390 U.S. at 401-02. The theory of private attorneys general which is now being used
effectively to encourage fee shifting, has previously had impact upon determinations of
who has standing to challenge administrative action. See K.C. DAvis, 3 ADMINISTRATxvn LAW
TREATISE § 22.05, at 225 (1958). A landmark opinion is that of Judge Jerome Frank in
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943): "Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official
person ... authority to bring a suit to prevent an action by an officer in violation of his
statutory powers . . . even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals."
42 Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D.N.C. 1968). The action in Cato was non-
statutory, and was brought to compel desegregation conforming to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the constitutional requirements. The court cited Piggie Park saying.
"While that decision is not binding here, it is suggestive." 293 F. Supp. at 1378.
43 Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969). Plaintiffs invoked 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1988 (1964) and claimed that the alleged population disparities between districts
which each elected one member to the board of supervisors constituted invidious dis-
crimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Only three years earlier the same
court had denied fees in a similar case, Damon v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Supervisors,
254 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss. 1966), where plaintiffs brought suit to compel realignment of
precincts in a county to conform with the constitutional requirements of one man-one vote.
In denying fees, the court stated at 918: "It is not without significance in view of the
general rule as to the award of attorneys' fees as cost, that the Congress provided in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . for the discretionary award of attorneys' fees in certain
cases, not including the case at bar."
44 Kerr v. City of Chicago, 6 C~aM. L. REP. 2448 (7th Cir. 1970). Here a civil action
was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1964) alleging involuntary confession and
numerous violations of plaintiff's civil rights. In granting attorney's fees the Seventh
Circuit held: "Federal common law controls the question of damages in civil rights actions
with the purpose being to vindicate the civil rights of individuals."
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votes by a materially misleading proxy statement.45 After ruling that
the proxy statement was indeed materially misleading and remanding
to the district court for consideration of the proper relief, the Supreme
Court turned to the request of the Solicitor General that the plaintiffs
be granted an interim award of attorneys' fees. The question had been
introduced in the government's amicus curiae brief and had been al-
most totally ignored by the litigating parties. 46
The request for fees presented major difficulties. Since only the issue
of liability was before it, the Court was being asked to make an award
of fees without knowing what the final resolution of the plaintiff's
action would be. More importantly, the action had been brought under
the statutory authority of section 14(a), which itself was completely
silent on the question of fees. This was in sharp contrast to sections
9(e) and 18(a)47 of the same act in which Congress had specifically
provided for fee shifting. The juxtaposition seemed to bring the Mills
facts directly under the Fleischmann doctrine that exceptions to the
traditional fee rule should not be developed "in the context of statutory
causes of action for which the legislature had provided intricate rem-
edies." 48 Another factor which seemed to make 14(a) an inappropriate
setting for fee transfer was its failure to authorize in explicit terms a
private right of action. That private right for stockholders had itself
been implied earlier in the landmark case of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak.49
Thus the circumstances seemed to support the traditional response-
that fee shifting in this case was unauthorized by congressional will.50
45 Securities Exchange Act of 1984, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1964).
It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an ex-
empted security) registered on any national securities exchange in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
46 The government maintained, ". .. in our view, the plaintiffs, who have established
a violation of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, are entitled to
litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees .. " Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 19, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
47 §§ 9(e) and 18(a) concern respectively manipulation of securities prices and misleading
statements in documents filed with the Commissioner. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1964).
48 386 U.S. at 719.
49 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
50 Justice Black concluded in dissent, "The courts are interpreters, not creators, of legal
rights to recover and if there is a need for recovery of attorneys' fees to effectuate the
policies of the Act here involved, that need should in my judgment be met by Congress,
not by this Court." 396 U.S. at 397. One district court held, in a like situation, that to
grant fees here "would be basing an implication on an implication-an implied right to
attorney's fees based on an implied civil liability." That court went on to note that the
authorities including Fleischmann "at best deflate the idea and at worst prohibit it."
Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Utah 1968).
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Nevertheless, the Mills Court chose to interpret congressional silence
not as a prohibition, but as an authorization to the court to decide the
attorneys' fee issue.51 The silence which two years earlier in Fleischmann
had meant the absence of congressional intent now became a mandate
to create and implement private remedies. The Court in Mills does not
clearly repudiate Fleischmann; rather, it takes some pains to distinguish
the earlier case and to limit its conclusions to the Lanham Act, where
Congress had "meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plain-
tiff who proves his valid trademark had been infringed. '"52
While the Lanham Act admittedly did provide remedies not avail-
able to the successful Securities Exchange Act plaintiff, the change in
philosophy since Fleischmann was obvious. Gone was the broad lan-
guage indicating that exceptions to the fee rule were few and far be-
tween. Also gone were the implications that these exceptions were
out of place in a statutory cause of action. Now "these sections merely
enforce an additional penalty against the wrongdoer." 53 The analytical
process is completely reversed. Where previously the courts were led
to start with the traditional rule and then ascertain whether the case
fell into one of the three Fleischmann-approved exceptions, now they
are to start with the equitable power of the courts to grant appropriate
remedies with the burden on the other side to prove a legislative
"purpose to circumscribe the courts' power." 54
Having surmounted the obstacle of congressional silence, the Court
was still faced with the task of locating a viable fee shifting rationale.
Nothing in the facts of Mills justified granting fees under any of the
traditional exceptions to the fee rule.55 Fee recovery in a stockholder's
suit was normally accomplished under only a "fund" rationale, 56 but
here no monetary recovery was sought. The Court needed a develop-
ment which in its own words had moved far "from the traditional
51 ". . leaving the courts with the task, faced by this Court in Borak, of deciding
whether a private right of action should be implied. The courts must similarly determine
whether the special circumstances exist that would justify an award of attorneys' fees ... 
396 US. at 391.
52 Id. (quoting Fleichmann). The Court continues, "By contrast, we cannot fairly infer
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe the courts' power to
grant appropriate remedies." The Court does not seem overly concerned with maintaining
the traditional facade of uniformity on the fee question: "both the courts and Congress
have developed exceptions to this rule for situations in which overriding considerations
indicate the need for such a recovery." 396 U.S. at 391-92.
53 396 U.S. at 390 (quoting Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943)).
54 396 U.S. at 391.
55 Vhile Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943), provided a circuit court
precedent for ignoring the silence-as-bar rule, there the rationale for the actual fee transfer
was the creation of a fund.
56 See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39
COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939).
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metes and bounds of the doctrine."' ' 7 The development to which the
Court turned had been initiated by a Supreme Court case, but from
that point on had been entirely the child of the state courts. The semi-
nal decision was Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,58 in which the
plaintiff, by vindicating her rights to a trust, established the rights of
fourteen others whom she never purported to represent. This was not
the creation of a fund in the traditional sense, but Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the Court, refused to hold the exception within its formal
limits:
[T]he formalities of the litigation-the absence of an avowed
class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare
decisis rather than through a decree-hardly touch the power
of equity in doing justice as between a party and the benefi-
ciaries of his litigation.59
It was in the state courts that the "formalities" really began to yield
to newly emerging policy imperatives. A brains v. Textile Realty Corp.60
and Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Power and Light Ass'n,61 both cited
in Mills, adopted a law enforcement-as-benefit rationale to award fees
to stockholder plaintiffs even where no fund was created. In Abrams
the defendant argued that while plaintiff's suit had prevented ultra
vires acts, economically speaking it had been detrimental to the corpora-
tion.6 2 However, the New York Supreme Court responded that "the
law cannot refuse to recognize as beneficial full observance of the law.
The law cannot hold that corporate interests are better served by ac-
tions outside the law than within the law."63 Similarly, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Bosch affirmed the concept of law enforcement-as-
benefit, cautioning only that the benefit must be "substantial." 64
In support of its move to a non-fund fee-shifting rationale, the
Mills Court, like the court in Bosch, made substantial reference to a
number of articles by George Hornstein. As Hornstein described the
problem, the stockholder's suit was the case of David and Goliath, with
David unable to afford the slingshot. Laws which authorized private
57 396 Us. at 893.
58 307 U.S. 161 (1989).
59 Id. at 167.
60 Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.Rd 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Here the stock-
holder proved that the corporation's manner of entering into a mortgage agreement was
contrary to the existing indenture and voting trust agreement.
61 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960). Plaintiff obtained a declaratory judgment
that the election of directors conducted by mail as well as a proposed amendment to
the bylaws was illegal.
62 97 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
t3 Id.
64 257 Minn. at 866, 101 N.W.2d at 426.
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actions against corporate defendants were rendered ineffective by the
traditional fee rule.65 The practical reality was that few stockholders
could afford the high cost of corporate litigation,66 especially as aug-
mented by the deliberate delaying tactics of the corporate defendant.
Hornstein concluded that effective enforcement mandated the shifting
of attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff as a "necessary concomitant
of allowing the stockholder's derivative suit, which is vital to the ex-
posure and redress of corporate abuse."' 7
Perhaps as important as Hornstein's definition of the situation was
his ability to label the formulated remedy. In describing the process
by which the shifting of fees would facilitate stockholder's suits, thereby
promoting fair conduct throughout the corporate world, Hornstein hit
upon the term "legal" or "corporate therapeutics."6 8 The term had
the advantage of bringing to mind a positive process image of the
function of increasing law enforcement by shifting the fee burden.
In accepting the rulings of Abrams and Bosch, together with the
Hornstein terminology, the Mills Court legitimized a stockholder's suit
fee exception based solely on law enforcement policy considerations.6 9
The Court was concerned not with the benefit of this suit to these
shareholders, but with the benefit of this type of suit to the public in-
terest: "[P]rivate stockholders' actions of this sort 'involve corporate
therapeutics,' and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an
important means of enforcement of the proxy statute."'70 Reimburse-
ment for attorney's fees is a means of enforcing the law. In short, the
Court granted an award for acting as a private attorney general. More-
over, the Court stated its basic principle in terms not limited to stock-
holder's suits, authorizing the shifting of fees in all cases "where a
plaintiff has successfully maintained a suit, usually on behalf of a class,
65 Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics-The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
HARV. L. REv. 658 (1956).
66 Hornstein, supra note 56, at 791.
67 Id. at 816.
68 Hornstein, supra note 65.
69 This is the narrow holding of the court: "[P]etitioners, who have established a viola-
tion of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, should be reimbursed by
the corporation or its survivor for the costs of establishing the violation." 396 U.S. at
389-90. This narrow holding was responsive to the amicus curiae brief of the United
States which in originally raising the issue had asserted that in cases which involve "corpo-
rate therapeutics" the absence of express statutory authorization should be no bar to fee
granting. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21.
70 396 U.S. at 396. A further indication that the benefit language acts as little more
than a facade for societal policy imperatives is the criterion delineated in the Mills fact
situation where the reference point is not the corporate defendant but the Congress. "[T]he
stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and. informed corporate suffrage leads
to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a
substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders." Id.
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that benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself."71 In
thus broadening the concept of benefit as well as its area of applica-
tion, the Court introduced the potential for radical changes in the
traditional fee doctrine.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE Mills DoCTRIUNE
It is impossible to predict whether the courts will take full advantage
of the opportunities implicit in the Mills language. At the very least,
the opinion should resolve the ambiguities created by the parallel
existence of Fleischmann and Piggie Park. Mills may properly be viewed
as an extension of the policy initiated in Piggie Park. Both cases dis-
regarded the traditional but unsatisfactory punishment rationale, and
in its place established the outlines of a positive theory of fee transfer.
Whether it be labeled "private attorney general" or "benefit" or "legal
therapeutics," the moving concept is the same-whatever the theoretical
disadvantages, the need to provide the individual with private law en-
forcing power makes fee shifting a practical necessity.
Mills is an affirmation of the pre-Fleischmann and post-Piggie Park
fee shifting trend. As such it should result in some defrosting of the
Fleischmann chill and in a resumption in the expansion of fee transfer
within the traditional exceptions. The Mills doctrine provides a coun-
ter-pole to the traditional anti-fee-shifting dogma and thereby provides
the theoretical substructure so evidently lacking in the trademark
cases.7 2 In this context the "benefit" and "therapeutics" language which
for so long animated the stockholder's development can be expected to
be equally effective in other areas. Moreover, the courts now have the
opportunity to de-emphasize the old process of scrutinizing each factual
situation for the elements of "bad faith" necessary to trigger fee trans-
fer under the old punishment rationale.7 8 Now the dominant element
in the decision-making process may be the emergence of a consensus
as to the societal benefits of encouraging private law enforcement. This
shift in analytical perspective from the variables of a given factual
situation to the constant of a public policy consensus may have an
71 896 U.S. at 892. According to the Court, the law has developed such that fees may
be shifted "where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the members of
an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among
them." 896 U.S. at 893-94.
72 See generally Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359r F.2d 156 (9th
Cir. 1966).
73 See Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E.. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 853, 863
n.52 (D. Del. 1960), stating: "The cases on allowance of attorneys fees could be multiplied
by the hundreds both plus and minus depending on the facts of each case."
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effect tantamount to the Piggie Park language-making future discre-
tionary fee shifting ordinary.
The broader impact of Mills lies in its "benefit" language augmented
by the simultaneous adoption of the supportive therapeutics principle.
"Legal therapeutics" is essentially a restatement of the deterrence theory
with the emphasis switched from public to private action.74 It confronts
the problem of prohibitively high litigation costs, and as such need not
be limited to corporate finance or stockholder's suits. Hornstein's cor-
porate world is nothing but a microcosm of the society-wide effects of
the traditional rule, and if successful litigation to enforce the law
makes for a better corporate world, it also makes for a world of viable
civil rights, more consumer protection and less air pollution.75 The fol-
lowing examples illustrate the potential impact of a positive Mills
development.
Actions challenging administrative decisions provide a primary pro-
tection against feeble law enforcement of pollution laws, and both
courts and legislatures have moved to strengthen that protection. Pre-
viously restrictive rules on standing to sue have been broadened" and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 7 has given new scope
to the power of judicial review. However, the cost of litigation has
chilled private challenges to administrative decision:
The trial may be lengthy and complex. Its conduct is a difficult
burden for the attorneys having the burden of proof assigned
to them by the substantial evidence-rational-basis rule, and
74 "They are therapeutic, helping to maintain the health of our corporate system. In
hundreds of suits which would not have been instituted without the allure of generous
compensation, a miscarriage of justice has been prevented. At the same time the record
of litigated cases is prophylactic-a deterrent to future wrongdoing. Every successful suit
duly rewarded encourages other suits to redress misconduct and by the same token dis-
courages misconduct which would occasion suit." Hornstein, supra note 65, at 663.
75 It must be recognized, however, that the actual response to a fee incentive may vary
tremendously because of factors outside the control of the courts. Attorney's fees are
often not the only deterrent to increased private law enforcement. Where, as in civil
rights, the gap between the present crisis and full protection is a result of lack of trust,
fear, ignorance and the political distastefulness of civil rights suits, as well as the fee
system, a change in the fee allocation alone can be expected to have a minimal effect.
See V. CouNTrYmAN, THE LAwYER IN MonERN SociEry pt. VI, at 81-126 (1962).
76 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965). One commentator noted that this case could result in environmental action
groups becoming the "vanguard of an assault on environmental pollution through the
courts." Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington,
5 HARV. CIV. R oGin-Crv. Lm. L. REv. 32, 36 (1970).
77 83 Stat. 852 (1970). The act provides a more thoroughgoing process, and an expanded
concept of the kinds of data and expertise relevant to an evaluation of an administrative
decision. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad.
ministrative Law, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 612, 649-50 (1970).
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who are not compensated at all, or compensated at a small
fraction of the amounts to which they are ordinarily entitled.71
This kind of suit offers an excellent opportunity for an expansive
Mills effect. It comes to the court fused with the clear public policy
imperatives of a statutory regulation. In addition, the relationship of
the parties is reflective of the Mills factual situation, since the govern-
ment may be said to stand in the same relation to the citizen as the
corporation to the stockholder. Forcing the government to pay fees is a
method of spreading the burden of enforcement among all the tax-
payers, who are the beneficiaries of that enforcement. Such a result
falls easily within the Mills language of benefit "on the members of an
ascertainable class," 719 and an award "that will operate to spread the
costs proportionately among them."80
Mills may similarly facilitate private actions directly against the vio-
lating party. This is particularly true in those areas such as consumer
protection and pollution control where injunctive relief against the
violator emerges as the most effective, if not the only, relief available.8
Prior to Mills the private suit for injunctive relief was less than a prac-
tical option; plaintiffs needed large damage awards from which the con-
tingent fee device could generate legal fee payments. One commentator
noted that the environmental lawyer faces the same kind of mammoth
defendant as the stockholder's attorney, yet he lacks the fee-shifting ad-
vantages traditional in the stockholder's suit8 2 Likewise, the failure of
attorneys to realize the potential of the injunctive remedy in consumer
actions has been linked directly to the fee implications of by-passing a
damage award.8 3
Although 'the plaintiff and defendant in the private injunctive action
may lack the kind of formal relationship between the plaintiff and
nominal defendant in Mills, the same policy considerations underlie
both cases-the importance of the therapeutic benefit derived from
statutory enforcement. Moreover, the effective support of private at-
torneys general would seem to mandate a judicial focus on the reception
78 Sive, supra note 77, at 619.
79 396 U.S. at 394.
80 Id.
81 Its flexible enforcement powers acting directly on the person of the defendant make
it appropriate in preventing continuing violations. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-
Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. Ray. 211, 213 (1969). In addition, in pollution
cases injunctive relief avoids the complex problem of allocating damages among a multi-
tude of polluters. Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 735,
747 (1970).
82 Sive, supra note 77, at 618.
83 Stars, supra note 81, at 212.
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of the recognized and costly "benefit" rather than on the formal rela-
tionship between the parties.
Such an approach would make a whole range of injunctive, law-
enforcing suits practical, irrespective of the absence of a damage award.
That focus would in addition support the creation of a fee incentive
which can be of significant value even where a damage award is autho-
rized. For example, sections 1983,84 1985,85 and 198680 of the Civil
Rights Act authorize civil actions for damages. The courts have utilized
these statutes to protect such varied freedoms as freedom of assembly,87
freedom from unreasonable search,88 and protection from batteries com-
mitted incident to an arrest or imprisonment.8 9 Yet here too the in-
sufficiency of the potential award has resulted in circumscribed use of
the authorized suits.9 0
Moreover, the potential for a Mills impact goes beyond those stat-
utes explicitly authorizing a private right of action. Where a statutory
scheme does not admit of a private right, the courts are increasingly
willing to imply such an action. For example, although the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 is silent as to actions other than those initiated by
the Attorney General, 91 the Supreme Court did not hesitate to find
an implied private right of action in the landmark case of Allen v.
Board of Elections.92 Indeed, Mills itself involved such an implied
right of action.
Moreover, the benefit rationale carried to its logical extreme cannot
be limited to actions tied to concrete expressions of legislative intent.
If law enforcement is the acknowledged benefit, there is little reason
to view the law of contracts as being of any less importance than the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Yet such a broad application of Mills
would represent a complete reversal of the traditional fee system.
Of course the courts may ignore the logic of the "benefit" language;
there are numerous ways in which the courts may limit Mills. First,
the case may be confined to its facts in the same manner that the Su-
preme Court in Mills distinguished Fleischmann---discriminating be-
84 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
85 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1964).
86 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1964).
87 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
88 Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965).
89 Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1963).
90 Note, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS
L. RFv. 1015, 1035 (1967).
91 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973j(d)-(e) (Supp. I, 1965).
92 393 U.S. 544 (1969), stating at 556: "The achievement of the Act's laudable goals
could be severely hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend solely on
litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General."
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tween statutes on the basis of the specificity of remedies contained
therein. Arguments limiting Mills to a narrow factual situation gain
weight from the particular statutory context in which Mills arose. The
Securities Exchange Act explicitly permits private rights of action in
three sections-18, 93 9(e),94 and 16(b).95 Of those three the first two
specifically authorize fee shifting, but 16(b) is silent on that question.
However, in Smolowe v. Delendo,96 the successful 16(b) plaintiff was
permitted to recover attorney's fees on the basis of the traditional fund
exception. One analysis of Smolowe argues that it simply brought in-
ternal symmetry to the act by permitting fee shifting in all private
actions including 16(b). In this perspective, Mills signifies nothing more
than the completion of the cycle by providing fee transfer for the newly
implied private action under section 14(a). Such an analysis would limit
a Mills application to those statutory schemes where a similar symmetry
argument could be made. However, nothing in the language gives sup-
port to so restrictive an analysis, and one may suppose that if the Court
was attempting to establish such a meticulous symmetry, it would have
left something in the language to indicate that intent. Indeed, such a
narrow interpretation would be entirely inconsistent with the broad
tenor of the opinion.
Second, the "benefit" language is open to various technical interpre-
tations. Mills ties the benefit to "corporate therapeutics,"9 7' and "the
stress placed by Congress on the importance..of fair and informed
corporate suffrage." 98 The Supreme Court looked neither to the actual
effect on the specific corporation nor to the motives of the plaintiffs.
Placing judicial emphasis on either of these two criteria could produce
radically different results under the same rule. Scrutinizing the inten-
tions of the plaintiffs would undoubtedly uncover some private motive
for the suit in almost every case, and examining the concrete effects on
the particular corporation might rule out "minor" benefits such as
temporary injunctions. Such a result clearly would contravene the core
of the Mills process, whereby fees were shifted without regard to the
eventual remedy. However, emphasis on these factors is a real pos-
sibility, not to be lightly dismissed.
The recent case of Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America99
93 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964).
94 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964).
95 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
96 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). Here the successful
16(b) plaintiff recovered over $18,000 for the corporation.
97 396 U.S. at 396.
98 Id.
99 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 10,996, at 19,202 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal docketed, Nos. 24,560,
24,561, 24,562, 24,563 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 20, 1970).
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is an unfortunate example of the potential impact of such limitations.
The case was brought under provisions of the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959100 which are silent as to attorney's
fees. Two other sections of the same act explicitly provide for fee
shifting.101 Ignoring the broad policy arguments behind the Mills deci-
sion, the district court decided this case on a specificity-of-remedies test.
Noting the "degree of similarity in the specificity of remedies between
the LMRDA and the Lanham Act,"' 02 the court found the case to be
governed by Fleischmann. As to the benefit criterion the court held
that it was not satisfied that the suits "were intended to or did benefit
the union except in the most indirect and theoretical way."' 03
Aside from these potential, technical limitations, substantive ques-
tions of interpreting the actual nature of the fee transfer effected in
Mills may arise. Mills held that the benefited class must pay the fees
of the plaintiff whose suit had created the benefit. Yet this rationale
was enunciated in the context of a stockholders' suit which, in a formal
sense, was the action of a few stockholders on behalf of all the others.
It might be argued that there was no real shifting of the burden of fees
from plaintiff to defendant. The corporate defendant is made to pay
merely as a means of distributing costs among the "true plaintiffs"-
that is, the stockholders on whose behalf the suit was brought. As stated
in Mills:
To award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has
succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle the
unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose them on
the class that has benefited from them and that would have
had to pay them had it brought the suit.104
However, unless one is willing to torture the concept of identity of
interest, the assertion that Mills does not involve true fee shifting fails
to make sense in light of the fact situation. Here over fifty per cent of
the stockholders were opposed to enforcement of the Securities Ex-
change Act regulations. Where a majority of the stockholders has an
interest opposed to the litigation, the payment of fees by the corpora-
tion represents true fee transfer.
The possibility of imposing a general policy limitation on Mills
seems difficult. The entire benefit concept implies a judgment that the
advantages that fee shifting produces by encouraging private actions
100 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(c), 529, 481(g) (1964).
101 Id. §§ 501(b), 431(c) (1964).
102 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 10,996, at 19,205 (D.D.C. 1970).
108 Id.
104 396 U.S. at 396-97.
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outweigh the disadvantages of possible nuisance suits. Yet, in certain
areas, the potential benefit to the public interest may be overshadowed
by the possible negative impact of actions brought to remedy merely
technical violations. This is especially true insofar as Mills alters the
previous practice of proportioning attorney's fees in direct relationship
to the financial award.10 5 No test which would successfully resolve such
a conflict can exist consistently with the Mills rationale, where concrete
tests based on economic benefit were discarded in favor of a focus on
"the stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and informed
corporate suffrage."' 0 6 Since there is no reason to assume that Congress
felt more strongly about the securities laws than about the civil rights
laws, the consumer protection laws, or indeed any other legislation,
the content of the Mills benefit test may be that the very existence of
legislation evidences the beneficial effect of its own enforcement. How-
ever, to certify every enforcement of legislation as beneficial may be to
invite an increase in suits whose chief motivation is their nuisance
value.
Parallels drawn from equitable fee shifting under section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act 0 7 indicate that fees may be shifted even
where no actual litigation has taken place. Although fee transfer in
16(b) takes place under the traditional fund rationale, the courts still
105 See Hornstein, supra note 65, at 663-64, arguing that a salvage analogy is and
should be the principle followed in awarding attorney's fees in stockholder's suits.
106 396 U.S. at 396. While the maintenance of a direct relationship between financial
benefit and fee award obviates the problem of nuisance suits, it implies significant limita-
tions on its efficacy as a general principle of fee transfer. Where the amounts involved are
small, the fee award will come nowhere near the actual costs of retaining counsel. To
the extent that Mills may herald the dissociation of the fee award from the dollar amount
of the damages, it may breathe new life into consumer actions, for instance, where charac-
teristically the amounts involved are not large.
107 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
tionship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for
a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request
or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall
be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such bene-
ficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which
the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of this subsection.
have had difficulty defining its boundaries. For example, awards of at-
torney's fees have been made where the stockholder's efforts have caused
the insider to pay up without the institution of an action.
If the objective is the recovery by the corporation of unlawful
profits, would it be reasonable to say that a stockholder shall
be entitled to all his expenses if he needs to bring suit, but he
shall be denied reimbursement where the same benefit to the
corporation has resulted without the necessity of legal proceed-
ings but at less expense? That would be penalizing efficiency
and expediency.108
More recent opinions have qualified the right to award fees indepen-
dent of an actual court action. In Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc.,09 the
Second Circuit attempted to find a "middle ground" between complete
denial of fees and automatic shifting which would encourage attorneys
to attempt to find a cause of action before the corporation does.
Reimbursement for information leading to corporate recov-
ery will be allowed only if the corporation has done nothing
for a substantial period of time after the suspect transactions
and its inaction is likely to continue.110
Clearly fee shifting under 14(a) may give rise to the same kind of pre-
litigation fee demands inspired by the 16(b) development, resulting in
the same tenuous and difficult efforts to find a viable middle ground.
In the corporate context, the prospect of fee shifting after long liti-
gation about technical violations, or an abundance of pre-litigation fee
transfer demands, may tip the burden too far against the corporation
and result in an increasingly timid corporate directorship. A negative
experience in the corporate sector can be expected to cancel any poten-
tial for an expansion of the Mills principle. On balance, it is possible
that the courts may discover that the nuisance value of Mills may out-
weigh the enforcement benefits. The nuisance potential may become
particularly acute if Mills is not expanded to include the successful de-
fendant as well as the successful plaintiff, but authority for such an
expansion is hard to find in the Mills opinion. The imperatives of en-
couraging private law enforcement do not mandate shifting the fee
burden from the successful defendant. Indeed, such a result might act
108 Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). See also
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Henss v. Schneider, 132 F. Supp.
60 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); and L. Loss, SEcuRrrIms RGULATIoN 1054 (2d ed. 1962) noting, "This
view, it is understood, has been consistently followed in a number of unreported in-
stances. It, is certainly sound, given the present statutory scheme."
109 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968).
110 Id. at 473.
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to chill the private enforcement potentials that Mills attempts to real-
ize. Yet to reserve the advantages of fee shifting to plaintiffs alone may
not only offend a court's refined sense of mutuality, but may result in
an overburdening of a legal system already threatened with congestive
breakdown.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mills did not intend to restructure the entire fee system. It was
an attempt to reconcile an outmoded fee process with what the Court
recognized as the compelling policy considerations of a new era. Ex-
plicit authorization to shift fees from successful defendants or even
from all successful plaintiffs was not even considered. Yet the logic of
the case provides no limitations, the principles evoked are without
bounds, and the language chosen lends itself easily to the most expan-
sive development. Logically, one of two things must happen: either
judicial discretion to grant fees on policy grounds will result in uni-
versal fee shifting from the successful party, or the courts will withdraw
to the traditional position, denying any fee transfer without specific
statutory authorization. Mills represents an uneasy half-way house be-
tween these two extremes.
